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Abstract
The populist radical right is frequently engaged in intense political and normative conflict with their political opponents.
Does this have a spillover effect on citizens’ sympathies for populist radical right voters and the voters of their political an-
tagonists, and if so, why? This is a study of citizens’ affective evaluation of radical right and social democratic voters when
exposed to intense conflict between the two parties at the elite level. It zooms in on the conflict between the Norwegian
Progress Party and the Labour Party that revolves around the trauma of the 22 July 2011 terror attacks, in which a for-
mer Progress Party member committed two devastating attacks against the Labour government and Labour Youth sum-
mer camp. This is studied using a survey experimental approach, relying on panel data from the Norwegian Citizen Panel.
Drawing on the authoritarian dynamics’ literature, it incorporates the four-item child-rearing values index measure of
authoritarian predispositions which offers a personality-based explanation for why people react differently to threat. In
contrast to the authoritarian dynamics’ literature, which has found that it is either authoritarians or non-authoritarians
who react, this study finds that both authoritarians and non-authoritarians simultaneously respond to high-intensity po-
litical conflict. Whereas non-authoritarians rally in support of social democratic voters, authoritarians rally in support of
radical right voters. Further differentiating between those with low and high authoritarianism scores, we see that low-
authoritarians also become more hostile to social democratic voters. This indicates that conflict involving populist radical
right parties is a driver of personality-based, affective sorting of citizens. Since personality is relatively stable, the resulting
state of polarization is also likely to be quite durable.
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1. Introduction
We know that elite partisan polarization—where party
elites from different parties grow increasingly ideolog-
ically distant from each other—impacts public opin-
ion formation (Druckman, Peterson, & Slothuus, 2013).
Partisan conflict can at times escalate far past such dis-
agreement over policy matters and become existential
in nature. Beyond issues of ideological polarization, this
study therefore examines what happens when conflict at
the elite level becomes so emotionally charged that the
opposing sides depict each other as a dangerous threat.
Does this also spill over onto the public’s affective evalu-
ation of the different partisan camps and impact on their
sympathies and antipathies? If so, why?
These questions are investigated using a survey ex-
perimental approach, relying on panel data from the
Norwegian Citizen Panel (NCP). It zooms in on the
struggle between the social democratic Labour Party
(Arbeiderpartiet, Ap) and their rivals from the pop-
ulist radical right Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet, FrP).
The two parties have been locked in conflict since the
Progress Party initially broke through in 1987, but the
trauma of the July 22, 2011 terror attacks added fuel to
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the fire. On that summer day, the right-wing extremist
Anders Behring Breivik carried out two consecutive at-
tacks, killing 77 people, injuring hundreds more and lay-
ing part of the government complex in ruins.
The attacks were traumatic, not just because they
were the first large-scale terrorist attacks in Norway,
but also due to the perpetrator’s background, ideolog-
ical motivation, and whom he targeted. Breivik was
a former member of the Progress Party and he at-
tacked their main political antagonist, the Labour Party.
Moreover, his attacks were ideologicallymotivated along
the same line of thinking that the Progress Party and
the broader anti-Islamic movement had espoused—that
Labour were responsible for Muslim immigration and
“sneak Islamization” of society (Berntzen & Sandberg,
2014). While Labour initially responded by framing the
terror as an attack on democracy itself rather than high-
lighting the terrorist’s motivation to strike at them specif-
ically, the attacks eventually began to bleed back into the
ongoing partisan conflict between the Labour Party and
Progress Party elites resulting in previously unseen lev-
els of acrimony. In the experiments, respondents are ex-
posed to perhaps the most intense exchange between
the two parties over this trauma.
The authoritarian dynamics literature offers a plausi-
ble explanation as to precisely how andwhy such volatile
elite conflicts might spill over depending on people’s per-
sonality traits. Drawing on findings from that body of
work, the overarching expectation is that people with
authoritarian predispositions react differently to non-
authoritarians. Therefore, variations in authoritarian pre-
dispositions should account for differing affective im-
pacts of exposure to this partisan struggle at the elite
level. To test this, the study incorporates the four-item
child-rearing values (CRV) index measure of authoritar-
ian predispositions.
This assumption seems to hold. Overall, authoritar-
ians do respond differently to the conflict than non-
authoritarians, but not in the straightforward manner
originally theorized. Initially, the argument was that au-
thoritarians are those who react to perceived threats
(e.g., Stenner, 2005). In contrast, subsequent studies
found that it was non-authoritarians who were reacting
(e.g., Hetherington & Suhay, 2011). I find that both non-
authoritarians and authoritarians react simultaneously
to this elite level conflict and that their reaction patterns
are opposite. Non-authoritarians rally around Labour vot-
ers, whereas authoritarians rally around Progress voters.
Furthermore, low-authoritarians also react by becoming
more hostile to Labour voters.
The remainder of the article is structured in the
following manner: The subsequent section situates the
study within the literature on polarization and authori-
tarian dynamics, followed by a section on the Norwegian
case and conflict between the two political parties. This
is followed by an overview of the data and research de-
sign, discussion of the results, and finally some conclud-
ing remarks.
2. Dynamics of Partisanship
In recent decades, radical right parties and move-
ments have become a fixture of the political landscape
in Western Europe (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Mudde, 2007;
Weisskircher & Berntzen, 2019). The radical right fac-
tion is fundamentally nativist and increasingly mobilizes
on an anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic platform (Berntzen,
2019). Defining themselves as the voice of the peo-
ple, their main political antagonists are the “elites”—
ranging from mainstream parties such as the social
democrats to human rights organizations, journalists,
and academics—whom they blame for fundamentally al-
tering the characteristics of Western nations by letting
them become Islamized.
A major concern is that the growth of such par-
ties and movements is leading to an increased affective,
partisan polarization of the citizenry (Mudde & Rovira
Kaltwasser, 2018), mirroring that which happened be-
tween Republicans and Democrats in the United States
(see e.g., Iyengar & Westwood 2015, p. 691). Affective
polarization is understood as an increasing distance be-
tween adherents of different identity-based groups, such
as parties and ideological factions. It is composed of two
dimensions: positive and negative partisanship. Positive
partisanship refers to an attachment to ones’ own
identity-group (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes,
1960, p. 143), in the form of sympathizing with, lov-
ing, and trusting them. Reversely, negative partisanship
refers to feeling antipathy, hatred, and distrust toward
members of another identity-based group.
Increased affective partisanship could have deleteri-
ous effects on the functioning of democratic institutions,
trust, and social cohesion. This scenario is made more
volatile by the spate of terror attacks committed by mil-
itant Islamists (Nesser, 2018) and right-wing extremists
(Ravndal, 2018) during the same period that the radical
right have become major players in party politics. It has
been established that elite partisan polarization impacts
public opinion (Druckman et al., 2013). What happens
when radical right politicians and their opponents en-
gage in elite partisan conflict surrounding such traumatic
events? Conflicts, where they politicize terror attacks by
laying blame and signaling distrust and dislike of each
other, could very well spill over onto citizens’ affective
evaluation of their voters.
Affective partisanship andpolarization has beenmea-
sured using a wide-ranging assortment of survey items,
such as feeling thermometers (Lelkes&Westwood, 2017,
p. 489), trait stereotypes (Garrett et al., 2014; Iyengar,
Sood, & Lelkes, 2012), trust (Levendusky, 2013), and
social-distance measures gauging how comfortable peo-
ple are in having close friends, neighbours, and hav-
ing their children marry someone from the other party
(Bogardus, 1947; Iyengar et al., 2012; Knudsen, 2018;
Levendusky & Malhotra, 2016). Of these, the feeling
thermometer is the most common measure (Lelkes
& Westwood, 2017, p. 489), where affective polariza-
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tion is computed as the difference between the score
given to the party of the respondent and the score
given to the opposing party (Iyengar, Lelkes, Levendusky,
Malhotra, &Westwood, 2019) or their voters (Druckman
& Levendusky, 2019).
In instances where we wish to study the partisan
impact of critical events and their politicization at the
elite level, aggregate measures of polarization may ren-
der specific patterns of partisanship more obscure, par-
ticularly in the multi-party systems which characterize
much of Western Europe. For this reason, looking at citi-
zens’ sympathies for the factions engaged in the conflict
and their partisan supporters is more relevant.
Regardless of the context, the drivers of negative and
positive affective evaluation of and by partisans are less
well understood, although the social-psychological work
on authoritarian dynamics offers a tantalizing answer. In
this work, authoritarianism is defined as a personality
trait, a pre-political need for conformity and resulting in-
tolerance toward difference (Feldman & Stenner, 1997;
Hetherington & Suhay, 2011; Stenner, 2005).
The work on authoritarian dynamics is informed by
the broader literature on authoritarianism, but the in-
sistence on understanding authoritarian dispositions as
independent from other political orientations or atti-
tudes sets them apart. The main critique levelled at
the broader field is that they have constructed and
utilized measures which conflate authoritarianism with
conservatism and specific prejudices (e.g., Feldman &
Stenner, 1997; Hetherington & Suhay, 2011), leading to
the misidentification of authoritarianism as a uniquely
right-wing phenomenon (Stenner, 2005; Stenner&Haidt,
2018). Child-rearing items contrasting personal auton-
omy and social conformity have become the most
favoured measure (e.g., Feldman & Stenner, 1997;
Hetherington & Suhay, 2011; Stenner, 2005) which ar-
guably allows us to escape the tautological reasoning
that has otherwise plagued the authoritarianism litera-
ture (Hetherington & Suhay, 2011, p. 550). The literature
on authoritarian dynamics is also unified by their empha-
sis on threat as a key interaction term which allows us to
explain many changes in attitudes and behaviour when
combined with authoritarianism.
While united in these respects, the authoritarian dy-
namics field can be roughly divided into two camps,
based on two disputes: First, is authoritarianism a latent
trait that only becomes activated under certain circum-
stances, or is it a consistent disposition? Second, who
is it that reacts to environmental stimuli in the form of
threats—authoritarians or non-authoritarians?
The first camp, epitomized by the pioneering work
of Stenner and Feldman, understand peoples’ authoritar-
ian dispositions as latent (e.g., Feldman, 2003; Feldman
& Stenner, 1997; Stenner, 2005; Stenner & Haidt, 2018).
That is, such dispositions have little to no bearing on their
political views, attitudes, and choices until they are ex-
posed to threateningmessages. Stenner and Feldman ar-
gue that people with authoritarian dispositions are par-
ticularly susceptible to normative threats:Messages that
instil a sense of perceived threat to the unity and unifor-
mity of society. In this account, it is those with interme-
diate to high authoritarianism scores who become acti-
vated under situations of threat. Several studies building
on the authoritarian dynamics theory have found simi-
lar results. While some studies find that threats increase
prejudice and intolerance across the board, it does so es-
pecially for those with marked authoritarian dispositions
(e.g., Lavine, Lodge, Polichak, & Taber, 2002; Merolla &
Zechmeister, 2009). Threats have, therefore, been de-
scribed as having a galvanizing effect on authoritarians
(Sniderman, Hagendoorn, & Prior, 2004).
In contrast, the other camp, most clearly embod-
ied by the work of Hetherington and colleagues (e.g.,
Hetherington& Suhay, 2011) argue that peoplewith high
levels of authoritarianism have relatively stable prefer-
ences when it comes to illiberal policies. This is taken
as an indication that their dispositions are not latent but
consistently and “chronically” activated (Hetherington &
Suhay, 2011, p. 548). Instead of it being the highly au-
thoritarian individuals who react to threat, they argue
that threat exposure most clearly impacts those with no
or lower levels of authoritarianism. It is this segment
of the population that alter their preferences, thereby
becoming more similar to the authoritarians. In other
words, the non-authoritarians “catch up” with the au-
thoritarians in what has been described as a mobiliz-
ing effect (Claassen & McLaren, 2019; Hetherington &
Suhay, 2011; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Vasilopoulos,
Marcus, & Foucault, 2018). Rather than utilizing norma-
tive threat, they contend that physical threat of terror
provides a better gauge as it ‘plausibly threatens those
across the authoritarianism distribution’ (Hetherington
& Suhay, 2011, p. 549).
These two positions and the findings that underpin
them have been presented as mutually exclusive (e.g.,
Claassen&McLaren, 2019).While the disagreement con-
tinues about whether or not those with high levels of
authoritarianism are always activated (Feldman, 2020),
more recent acknowledgement that non-authoritarians
may respondwhen they believe the actions of some peo-
ple can ‘significantly reduce their freedom of or be a
direct threat to their lives’ (Feldman, 2020, p. 42), sug-
gests that the two positions are not completely at odds.
In other words, while authoritarians react when they per-
ceive a challenge to traditional norms and values, non-
authoritarians are most concerned with threats to per-
sonal and civil freedoms.
Therefore, the specific threats people are exposed to
seem to produce different outcomes. Previous studies
have found that one of the two groups react—either the
authoritarians galvanize, or the non-authoritarians mo-
bilize. It is important to note that none of these studies
have zoomed in on specific partisan conflicts, but often
look at more overarching issues such as opposition to im-
migration (e.g., Claassen & McLaren, 2019; Sniderman
et al., 2004), support for increased security and surveil-
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lance measures (e.g., Vasilopoulos et al., 2018), as well
as support for specific political parties (e.g., Vasilopoulos
& Lachat, 2018). When it comes to affective political con-
flict at the elite level, however, it is plausible that non-
authoritarians rally in response to one party, whilst au-
thoritarians rally in response to another.
3. The Terror Attacks and Political Conflict between the
Radical Right and Social Democrats
The most prominent conflict that the radical right
Progress Party is engaged in is with the social democratic
Labour Party. This conflict has simmered ever since the
Progress Party had their first electoral breakthrough in
1987 and has primarily revolved around issues of Muslim
immigration and national security. The conflict escalated
after the 22 July 2011 terror attacks, when the right-wing
extremist Anders Behring Breivik killed 77 people in two
terrorist attacks directed at the government quarters and
Labour Youth camp (see e.g., Berntzen&Sandberg, 2014).
Breivik obsessed over the supposed “sneak Islamization”
of Norway for which he primarily blamed the Labour
Party. The term “sneak Islamization” was initially intro-
duced to Norwegian political discourse by Progress Party
leader Siv Jensen during the parliamentary election cam-
paign 2009—in which she too blamed the Labor Party for
this supposed development (Jupskås, 2015, p. 68).
Not long before the attacks, the Progress Party had
campaigned on the issue of Norway becoming Islamized
by stealth, the very same issue that Breivik claimed mo-
tivated his attacks against the Labour government and
party (Berntzen & Sandberg, 2014). Despite this, the pri-
mary political reaction in the immediate aftermath was
one of unity and depoliticization of the attacks by deem-
phasizing the fact that the terrorist deliberately targeted
the Labour government and the Labour Youth camp
(Lödén, 2014). Instead, the then Prime Minister, Jens
Stoltenberg of the Labour Party, described it as an ‘at-
tack on us all,’ promising that the responsewould only be
‘evenmore democracy’ (Stoltenberg, 2011). Additionally,
Stoltenberg made a public appeal to ‘tone down anti-
immigrant rhetoric’ and to ‘avoid assigning blame to a
particular political party’ (Wiggen, 2012)—meaning the
Progress Party. While stating that ‘the party accepted
no responsibility for the heinous crimes committed by
Breivik,’ Progress Party leader Siv Jensen also proclaimed
that they would stop using the same rhetoric as they had
before (Wiggen, 2012). In otherwords, both the terror at-
tack and issues of immigration and any supposed “sneak
Islamization” were off the table—for a time.
In the local elections held not long after, the Labour
Party surged while the Progress Party suffered a setback.
The Progress Party’s loss of support was in large part be-
cause immigration, their most important issue, had not
been discussed (Bergh& Bjørklund, 2013). During the na-
tional elections in 2013, the Progress Party also suffered
a substantial electoral setback, but nevertheless man-
aged to enter government for the first time. They formed
a minority coalition government with the Conservative
Party (Høyre, H) by securing parliamentary backing from
the Christian Democrats (Kristelig Folkeparti, KrF) and
the Liberals (Venstre, V), thereby replacing the previ-
ous Labour-led government. The Progress Party and
Conservatives secured a second term in government af-
ter the 2017 national elections, initially with continued
parliamentary backing from the Christian Democrats and
Liberals. This was followed by the Liberals and subse-
quently the Christian Democrats officially entering the
government coalition as of January 2018 and January
2019, respectively.
As the years passed the initial depoliticization of the
terror attacks met resistance from factions within the
Labour Party. Meanwhile, the parliamentary wing of the
Progress Party gradually returned to form and became
more strident in their anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim
messaging (Jupskås, 2016, p. 179). This closely coin-
cided with the rise of a faction within the Labour Party
who wanted to hold the Progress Party responsible. It
infused a new level of acrimony and vitriol into the
conflict between the two factions. An early portent
of the future hostilities came during the transition pe-
riod after the national elections in 2013 and just be-
fore the Labour-led government tendered its resignation
when Prime Minister Stoltenberg asked Progress Party
leader Siv Jensen to apologize for using the term “sneak
Islamization”—a request she promptly refused (Johnsen
& Hvidsten, 2013).
The conflict reached its peak after Minister of Justice
Sylvi Listhaug from the Progress Party shared a post on
Facebook, March 9, 2018, writing that ‘the Labor Party
believes that the rights of terrorists are more important
than the nation’s security. LIKE AND SHARE!’ accompa-
nied by a picture of an Islamic State-soldier wielding a
knife (Svaar, 2018). Labour party leader Jonas Gahr Støre
retorted by saying that Sylvi Listhaug from the Progress
Party ‘deliberately, calculatedly, kindles the hatred that
took so many lives on 22 July’ (Sørsdahl, 2018).
Listhaug was subsequently forced to resign as
Minister of Justice on March 20, 2018 but maintained
her prominent position within the ranks of the Progress
Party and was officially elected as 1st Deputy Leader on
May 5, 2019 (Gilbrant & Suvatne, 2019). In a sign of re-
newed confidence by the coalition government, Listhaug
was also appointed as Minister of Health and Care ser-
vices, May 3, 2019.
The Progress Party withdrew from the coalition gov-
ernment on January 20, 2020, after having sat in govern-
ment for six years, two months and twenty days. They
chose to withdraw after the government extracted a fe-
male Islamic State member and her children from an in-
ternment camp in Syria (Jensen, 2020). The Conservative
PrimeMinister Erna Solberg had initially opposed retriev-
ing female Islamic Statemembers and their childrenwith
Norwegian citizenship, whereas the government coali-
tion partners the Christian Democrats and Liberals and
several opposition parties including Labour had gone out
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in favour of ‘bringing them home’ (Johnsen, 2019). For
the Progress Party, the issue of extracting these women
and their children was directly related to the heated
conflict between then Minister of Justice Listhaug and
Labour leader Gahr Støre. Listhaug herself argued the
conflict which played out in March 2018 was based on
a misrepresentation of her desire to enact a law with-
drawing Norwegian citizenship from Islamic State fight-
ers (Sylvi Listhaug forsvarer, 2018).
4. Data and Research Design
Data for the study (N = 1370) were collected from a
probability-based online national survey conducted by
theNCP betweenMay 21 and June 10, 2019. See theNCP
methodology report for details (Skjervheim, Høgestøl,
Bjørnebekk, & Eikrem, 2019). The data is available free of
cost for scholars via the Norwegian Social Science Data
Archive. The study includes measures for authoritarian
pre-dispositions, experimental exposure to political con-
flict, and party voter likeability for Labour and Progress
Party voters.
The main hypothesis of this study is that the effect
of exposure to the 22 July-related political conflict be-
tween radical right Progress Party and the social demo-
cratic Labour Party on citizens’ sympathies toward these
two parties’ voters vary according to peoples’ authoritar-
ian predispositions. To test this, I have chosen a between-
subjects experimental design. The experimental design
consists of exposure to statements by the then Minister
of Justice, Sylvi Listhaug (Progress Party) and party leader
Jonas Gahr Støre (Labour Party) in the form of vignettes.
Whereas the Progress Party message describes Labour
as a challenge to traditional norms and values by placing
the rights of (Muslim) terrorists above national security,
the Labour message is that the Progress Party induces
right-wing extremism which poses a threat to peoples’
personal safety and liberty. In the case of the Progress
Party message, the physical threat of terror is present
butmore implicit. Respondents were randomly allocated
to one of two treatments or control (no treatment), and
subsequently asked to rate how much they like or dis-
like Labour and Progress Party voters, respectively, on
a seven-point sympathy barometer scale established as
standard in the NCP, ranging from “intensely dislike” (1)
to “intensely like” (7).
Note that respondents were explicitly asked about
their view of party voters and not the party itself.
Sympathy measures that only use the party label
in their question wording (for instance asking about
“Republicans” and “Democrats” in the US) have been
found to measure affect for party elites and not the
masses (Druckman&Levendusky, 2019). The Like–Dislike
sympathy barometer is itself an established measure to
gauge affect and polarization (see e.g., Gidron, Adams, &
Horne, 2019; Hansen & Kosiara-Pedersen, 2017; Lauka,
McCoy, & Firat, 2018) and is an attempt to get at the
same phenomenon as the more traditional feeling ther-
mometer’s answer scale that ranges between 0 and 100.
The degree to which these are functionally equivalent
or whether one is superior to the other has not yet
been established.
The full wording of the survey experiments expos-
ing respondents to the 22 July-related political con-
flict between the Progress Party and Labour Party were
as follows:
Progress Party message
Please read the text below carefully. Norway has ex-
perienced various political conflicts in recent times.
Whilst involved in one of these conflicts, Sylvi Listhaug
from the Progress Party wrote that ‘the Labour Party
believes that the rights of terrorists are more impor-
tant than the nation’s security. LIKE AND SHARE!.’
Labour Party message
Please read the text below carefully. Norway has ex-
perienced various political conflicts in recent times.
Whilst involved in one of these conflicts, Jonas Gahr
Støre from the Labour Party said that Sylvi Listhaug
from the Progress Party ‘deliberately, calculatedly,
kindles the hatred that took somany lives on the 22nd
of July.’
Previouswork on authoritarianismwhere threats arema-
nipulated in an experimental setting (e.g., Lavine, Lodge,
& Freitas, 2005; Merolla & Zechmeister, 2009; Stenner,
2005) have been criticized on (at least) two counts. First,
because they are only able to activate a threat response
from those at one end of the authoritarianism scale
but not the other (Hetherington & Suhay, 2011, p. 551).
Second, because the relationship between the exoge-
nous threats created by the experimenter and real-world
threats often remain unclear due to the fictitious nature
of the experiment (Hetherington & Suhay, 2011, p. 551),
with there sometimes being a vague operationalization
of threat or at other times more outlandish scenarios.
My experimental conditions address both points of
criticism. First, the treatments are direct replications of
a heated real conflict on a word for word basis. While
a full year passed between the intense episode and its
utilization in the survey, no other episodes arose in the
interim to eclipse it nor did the two parties make any
significant attempts at reconciliation. This has its own
potential drawbacks but provides some assurance that
the messages will be perceived as threatening. Second,
both relate to the threat of terrorism, either by right-
wing extremists or Islamist extremists. In addition, both
messages single out their political opponents as the un-
derlying cause of this threat. They thereby cover both
dimensions—physical and normative threat—that have
been stressed by both sides in the academic debate.
The measure for authoritarianism used in the analy-
sis is constructed from four questions that contrast pairs
of CRV in terms of personal autonomy versus social con-
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formity. Respondents were asked to choose which is
more important to them: independence or respect for
parents; obedience or self-reliance; being considerate
or well-behaved; and curiosity or good manners. Each
question was coded so that the authoritarian option
was equal to 1 and the non-authoritarian option was 0.
A scale was created by averaging across the four ques-
tions. The scale was then collapsed, where choosing 3
to 4 of the authoritarian options is classified as high-
authoritarian, 2 as low-authoritarian, and 0 to 1 as non-
authoritarian (see Figure 1). The authoritarianism mea-
sure is crucial to discern whether, and why, exposure to
partisan conflict at the elite level may have different ef-
fects on citizens’ affective evaluation of voters.
My choice of collapsing the authoritarianism scale
into three categories deviates from the more prevalent
approaches of treating it either as a continuous or di-
chotomous variable. At the same time, the resulting ana-
lyses are consistently discussed using a similar tripartite
distinction (e.g., Hetherington & Suhay, 2011, p. 553;
Stenner & Haidt, 2018, p. 192). This indicates that there
are meaningful qualitative differences between people
with low, intermediate, and high scores that have impli-
cations for when and why someone’s predispositions be-
come activated. Considering this, treating authoritarian-
ism as a categorical and not a continuous or simply di-
chotomous variable allows for a more straightforward
reading of the potentially differentiated interaction ef-
fects between varying levels of authoritarianism and the
two experimental treatments (threat messages).
5. Results
During the last decade, there has been an ongoing de-
bate about the proper use, interpretation, and presenta-
tion of statistical inference. In my analysis, I try to steer
clear of the standard pitfalls, such as using p < 0.05
as a clear line distinguishing between significance and
non-significance (Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016). Instead,
I embrace the ATOM principle—“Accept uncertainty. Be
thoughtful, open, and modest” (Wasserstein, Schirm, &
Lazar, 2019, p. 2). To do so, I differentiate between
substantive and statistical significance while enumerat-
ing all results for transparency—providing effect sizes,
standard deviations and significance values reported
as continuous quantities. For p-values, I refer to Hug’s
(2019) designations ranging from decisive evidence for
p-values ranging between 0.000–0.001, very strong for
p< 0.001–0.004, strong for p< 0.004–0.012, substantial
for p < 0.012–0.037, moderate for p < 0.037–0.132 and
weak for p < 0.132–1.000.
I begin by looking at the aggregate effects on citi-
zens’ sympathies for Progress and Labour Party voters
(see Figure 2). Herewe see that exposure to the elite con-
flict does not substantively shift citizens’ sympathies for
radical right Progress Party voters, nor Labour Party vot-
ers. Concerning the affect for Labour voters, the effect
of the Labour message is substantively negligible to non-
existent (b = 0.039, SD = 0.082, p = 0.587). The same
holds when it comes to the impact of the Progress mes-
sage (b= 0.044, SD= 0.081, p= 0.632). For citizens’ sym-
pathies for Progress voters, we see that the Labour mes-
sage may exert a very small substantive effect in favour
of Progress voters (b = 0.134, SD = 0.097, p = 0.169),
but the weak p-value makes any clear conclusions un-
tenable. The Progress message has no discernible effect
(b = 0.021, SD = 0.099, p = 0.829).
Having established that the elite conflict between
the Progress Party and Labour has no notable effects on
sympathies toward the respective parties’ voters when
looking at the population in aggregate, I now turn to
citizens’ sympathies sorted by their authoritarian pre-
dispositions. Authoritarianism is here treated as a cate-
gorical variable, ranging from non-authoritarian to low-
authoritarian and finally high-authoritarian.
The main expectation was that citizens’ response
to exposure to elite conflict between the radical right
Progress Party and social democratic Labour Party should
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Figure 1. Distribution of authoritarian pre-dispositions. Notes: NCP, wave 15. N = 1370. Bars reflect % of the population
falling into each category.
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Figure 2.No aggregate effect of exposure to elite conflict between Progress Party and Labour Party on citizens’ sympathies
for their voters. Notes: NCP, wave 15. N = 1340. * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
vary depending on their levels of authoritarian predis-
positions. The formula below summarizes the OLS pro-
cedure for identifying the affective evaluation of Labour
and Progress voters, respectively:
Sympathy for party voters =
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 (Low authoritarianism)
+ 𝛽2 (High authoritarianism)
+ 𝛽3 (Labour message) + 𝛽4 (Progress message)
+ 𝛽5 (Low authoritarianism × Labour message)
+ 𝛽6 (High authoritarianism × Labour message)
+ 𝛽7 (Low authoritarianism × Progress message)
+ 𝛽8 (High authoritarianism × Progress message) + 𝜀
I now turn to look at sympathy for Labour Party voters
(see Figure 3). Non-authoritarians become slightly more
sympathetic toward Labour Party voters when exposed
to both the Labour message (b = 0.204, SD = 0.117,
p = 0.083) and the Progress message (b = 0.28,
SD = 0.119, p = 0.021). In other words, the conflict
seems to have a rallying effect on non-authoritarians in
favor of Labour. For low-authoritarians, the directional-
ity is reversed for both exposure to the Labour message
(b = −0.49, SD = 0.221, p = 0.026) and the Progress mes-
sage (b = −0.384, SD = 0.221, p = 0.084). Substantively,
the effects of exposure to the Labour message are rela-
tively strong, making low-authoritarians more unsympa-
thetic toward Labour voters. For high-authoritarians, ex-
posure to the political conflict has no discernible impact
on their sympathies for Labour voters, neither in the case
of the Labour message (b = 0.13, SD = 0.243, p = 0.594)
nor the Progress message (b = −0.30, SD = 0.224,
p = 0.223).
Let us now look at citizens’ sympathies for Progress
Party voters, beginning with non-authoritarian citizens
(see Figure 4). The Progress message has substantively
small, but discernible impact (b = −0.230, SD = 0.142,
p = 0.105), indicating that it makes non-authoritarians
somewhat more unsympathetic toward Progress vot-
ers. In contrast, the Labour message condemning the
Progress Party has no noticeable effect (b = −0.139,
SD = 0.140, p = 0.322). For low-authoritarians, the
Labour message has a, substantively speaking, moder-
ate rallying effect on their sympathies for Progress voters
(b = 0.478, SD = 0.263, p = 0.070). The same is not the
case for the Progress message (b = 0.307, SD = 0.265,
p = 0.247). Finally, for the high-authoritarians we see
that whilst the Labour message has no discernible effect
(b = 0.352, SD = 0.289, p = 0.224), the Progress mes-
sage has a noticeable substantive rallying effect on their
sympathies for Progress voters (b = 0.758, SD = 0.292,
p = 0.010). That is, highly authoritarian individuals be-
come more positive toward Progress voters.
The main expectation was that citizens’ response
to exposure to elite conflict between the radical right
Progress Party and the social democratic Labour Party
should vary depending on their levels of authoritarian
predispositions. This is borne out; authoritarians do, by
and large, respond differently to the conflict than non-
authoritarians. Overall, low-authoritarians are the most
susceptible to the conflict. Both Labour and Progress
messages have a counter-mobilizational effect, decreas-
ing their sympathy for Labour voters, whereas the Labour
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Figure 3. Exposure to elite conflict rallies non-authoritarians for and mobilizes low-authoritarians against Labour party
voters, with no discernible impact on high-authoritarians. NCP, wave 15. N = 1045. * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
(but not the Progress message) has a rallying effect in
favour of Progress voters. Substantively, the effect sizes
are intermediate. In contrast, we see that exposure does
not alter the affective evaluation of Labour voters by high-
authoritarians, but when exposed to the Progress mes-
sage they become markedly more sympathetic toward
Progress voters. In comparison, non-authoritarians be-
come somewhat more sympathetic toward Labour vot-
ers when exposed to the conflict. Concerning their sym-
pathies for Progress voters, the Labour message has no
impact while the Progress message seems to make them
slightly less sympathetic. See Table 1 for a full overview.
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Figure 4. Exposure to elite conflict between Labour and Progress party mobilizes non-authoritarians against and rallies low-
and high-authoritarians for Progress party voters. NCP, wave 15. N = 1046. * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1. Citizens’ sympathy for Labour and Progress Party voters (OLS).
Labour voters (1) Progress voters (1) Labour voters (2) Progress voters (2)
Predictors Estimates CI P Estimates CI P Estimates CI P Estimates CI P
(Intercept) 4.32 *** 4.21–4.43 < 0.001 3.14 *** 3.01–3.28 < 0.001 4.35 *** 4.19–4.51 < 0.001 3.01 *** 2.81–3.20 < 0.001
Labour message −0.04 −0.20–0.12 0.587 0.13 −0.06–0.33 0.169 0.20 * −0.03–0.43 0.083 −0.14 −0.42–0.14 0.322
Progress message 0.04 −0.12–0.20 0.632 0.02 −0.17–0.22 0.829 0.28 ** 0.04–0.51 0.021 −0.23 −0.51–0.05 0.105
Low authoritarianism 0.04 −0.25–0.34 0.795 0.21 −0.15–0.57 0.255
High authoritarianism −0.48 *** −0.81—0.15 0.004 0.41 ** 0.02–0.80 0.040
Labour msg × Low auth −0.49 ** −0.93—0.06 0.026 0.48 * −0.04–1.00 0.070
Progress msg × Low auth −0.38 * −0.82–0.05 0.084 0.31 −0.21–0.83 0.247
Labour msg × High auth 0.13 −0.35–0.61 0.594 0.35 −0.22–0.92 0.224
Progress msg × High auth −0.30 −0.78–0.18 0.223 0.76 *** 0.18–1.33 0.010
Observations 1340 1341 1045 1046
R2/R2 adjusted 0.001/–0.001 0.002/0.000 0.039/0.032 0.053/0.045
Notes: * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
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6. Conclusion
This is the first study of how affective polarization and
terror-related conflict at the elite level impacts citizens’
sympathy toward voters. It helps piece together pre-
cisely how threats may alter peoples’ attitudes and pref-
erences. It has done so by utilizing a concrete, real-world
conflict and messages that are likely to be perceived as
threatening in one way or another to large segments of
the population. The study shows that terror-related con-
flict between the radical right and social democrats has a
spill-over effect on citizens’ sympathies for their voters.
The conflict affects citizens’ according to their exist-
ing authoritarian predispositions. Non-authoritarians re-
act by rallying around social democratic partisans, whilst
low- and high-authoritarians rally around radical right
partisans. The findings, therefore, speak directly to the
ongoing debate within the authoritarianism field, provid-
ing support for a modified version of what has been la-
belled the authoritarian dynamics’ theory. Initially, the
argumentwas that peoplewith authoritarian personality
traits would react to exposure to threats (e.g., Feldman
& Stenner, 1997; Stenner, 2005). Later findings instead
indicated that non-authoritarians were the ones who re-
acted strongly to threats. Some have posited these as
competing explanations (e.g., Claassen&McLaren, 2019;
Hetherington & Suhay, 2011). In my study, however, it
becomes clear that both non-authoritarians and author-
itarians can react simultaneously when exposed to high-
intensity, partisan conflict at the elite level.
As to the dispute over whether authoritarians are
“chronically” activated (Hetherington & Suhay, 2011)
or only become activated under specific circumstances
(Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Stenner, 2005), my find-
ings provide some support for the latter position. The
academic disagreement on this count may simply re-
flect the nature of the given scenarios investigated.
For one, they have frequently looked at or experimen-
tally utilized differing threats. Furthermore, they have
not looked at episodes of actual partisan conflict. My
findings demonstrate that both authoritarians and non-
authoritarians can become simultaneously “activated”
by political conflict within the same polity. Strictly speak-
ing, this is therefore not just an authoritarian dynamic
in the sense originally implied by Feldman, Stenner and
others (e.g., Feldman & Stenner, 1997), where only au-
thoritarians react.
Now, why exactly is it that we see these different re-
sponse patterns? While both messages contain a physi-
cal and normative threat element, the Labour Party mes-
sage is more in line with what the literature indicates
that non-authoritarians react to while the Progress Party
message is more in line with what authoritarians react
to. Yet, while this episode is among the most intense, it
is not the first instance of conflict between the two par-
ties along these normative lines. The response patterns
are relatively uniform, with non-authoritarians becom-
ing more sympathetic to Labour voters when exposed
both to the Labour and the Progress message, indicat-
ing that their response is at least partially conditioned by
the considerable length of time they have been exposed
to the conflict between the radical right and their so-
cial democratic antagonists over the years. For instance,
the Progress Party has consistently painted the Labour
Party as a threat to the unity and cohesion of “tradi-
tional” Norwegian society through Muslim immigration
and “sneak Islamization,” whereas the Labour Party de-
picts the Progress Party as a threat to decency, political
stability, and minority rights.
Owing to the nature of the experiments utilized in
this study, it is difficult to truly disentangle whether
these variations are due to the messages, the actors, or
a combination of the two. Just as with this case, real-
world conflicts often involve different themes and threat
scenarios pushed by specific political actors. To build on
the findings presented in this paper, a next step would
be to design new experiments with hypothetical scenar-
ios varying all the elements above. Another related as-
pect to investigate further is the more complex, longitu-
dinal interaction-effects between direct party identifica-
tion and authoritarianism within multi-party systems.
To reiterate, the key findings were that 1) both non-
authoritarians and authoritarians (low to high) can re-
act simultaneously to threats, and that 2) in the case of
partisan conflict their reaction patterns may be diamet-
rically opposite. While the terror attacks themselves and
the subsequent conflict is specific to the Norwegian case,
it is in my estimation very plausible that these findings
are generalizable to other cases within the sphere of lib-
eral democracies in Western Europe and elsewhere. The
socio-political specificity of these cases, however, such
as processes of partisan sorting over a long period and
the comparative primacy of party-political identity over
ethnicity and other identities (see e.g., Westwood et al.,
2018), makes it less likely that the findings can be read-
ily generalized to non-WEIRD populations (Western, ed-
ucated, rich and democratic).
In any case, within the sphere of liberal democra-
cies, the results indicate that a continued conflict at
the elite level between the radical right and their so-
cial democratic adversaries may contribute to a grow-
ing affective, partisan divide among citizens based on
their authoritarian pre-dispositions in terms of whom
they sympathize with. Beyond the overarching similari-
ties in culture and political development, this position
is premised on the finding that personality is relatively
stable over time (e.g., Stenner, 2005, on authoritarian-
ism; for stability of broader personality traits, see e.g.,
Damian, Spengler, Sutu, & Roberts, 2019; Hampson &
Goldberg, 2006). Non-authoritarians could drift closer
to the “mainstream,” pro-social democratic camp and
the low- to high-authoritarians in the “populist,” pro-
radical right camp. If the pattern of conflict is main-
tained, it could cause a relatively even affective split of
the population, as non-authoritarians make up around
half the population and the combined tally of low- to
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high-authoritarians the other half. The impact on neg-
ative affect is less clear-cut, but here we could also
see an increasing gap as low-authoritarians move fur-
ther away from the non-authoritarians and closer to the
high-authoritarian baseline. The result may well be that
the neutral ground—holding neither sympathies nor an-
tipathies for either party camp—is whittled away. This
would be in line with but not as far-ranging as the sce-
nario Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser discuss, wherein pol-
itics is completely bifurcated into a struggle between
“liberal democracy” and “populism” (Mudde & Rovira
Kaltwasser 2018, p. 1685).
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